Notes from the Playground by Striano, Maura
 




Notes from the Playground










Maura Striano, « Notes from the Playground », European Journal of Pragmatism and American
Philosophy [Online], XII-1 | 2020, Online since 16 June 2020, connection on 26 June 2020. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1902  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1902 
This text was automatically generated on 26 June 2020.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Notes from the Playground
The Educational Process Between Contingency and Luck
Maura Striano
In his autobiographical writing Trotsky and the Wild Orchids (1992 [1999]) Richard Rorty
vividly describes an emblematic episode of his adolescence that has a specific value in
terms of his educational reflection: when he was an adolescent, bullies regularly used
to beat him up in the playground of his high school, an action that he was unable to
avoid. This scene, indeed, portrays a recurring theme of his school life, which assigns
predefined roles to different actors – the bullies and their designated victim – and it is,
therefore, a good example of what Richard Bernstein would identify as one of the many
“concrete  social  forms of  cruelty”  (Bernstein  1992:  287)  that  we somehow take  for
granted. On the other hand, Rorty’s narration of the episode effectively illustrates what
Rachel Haliburton acknowledges as the capacity of  the liberal  ironist  to provide an
effective re-description of “what humiliates,” drawing this from a personal awareness
of the various ways in which human beings can be humiliated (Haliburton 1997: 56).
Indeed, as Rorty points out in the introduction to Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989)
“for  liberal  ironists,  there  is  no  answer  to  the  question  ‘Why  not  be  cruel?’  –  no
noncircular theoretical backup for the belief that cruelty is horrible. Nor is there an
answer to the question ‘How do you decide when to struggle against injustice and when
to devote yourself to private projects of self-creation?’” (Rorty 1989: xv). This decision
is a matter of contingency, and has to do with what Rorty defines as “luck.” The young
Richard decides to “escape” from the humiliating situation he was trapped in by seizing
the opportunity to leave ordinary high school in order to attend the Hutchin “college”
at the Universiy of Chicago, thereby starting to re-describe his life project according to
a new and different perspective. Through his narration of this episode Rorty invites us
to acknowledge the capacity that each individual has to create and re-create one’s self,
diverting one’s path away from expected roles and performances defined according to
a predetermined script, which reflect the contingent requests of the public dimension
in which individuals are embedded, and overcoming the dialogues and narratives one
may feel trapped in.
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From  a  pedagogical  point  of  view,  this  is  a  crucial  point,  since  it  reflects  the
relationship  between the  individual  and  society  and  has  to  do  with  what  Rorty  in
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) describes with the term “edification,” which is
a  substitute  both  for  education  (“a  bit  too  flat”)  and  Bildung (“a  bit  too  foreign”),
indicating a process taking us “out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid
us  in  becoming  new  beings”  (Rorty  1979:  360).  Edification  implies  a  profound  re-
description  of  one’s  life  conditions  and  represents,  indeed,  for  Rorty,  the  only
possibility of escaping from, but not overcoming, cruelty and humiliation, since there is
no  way  to  convince  whoever  performs  cruel  acts  of  the  inappropriateness  of  this
behavior, if she/he has been raised with the conviction that such acts are permissible
in  a  determinate  social  context  or  if  they  are,  for  some  reason,  rewarding  or
satisfactory.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  environments  within  which  individuals  and
communities grow up and, in particular,  the conversations and discourses in which
they are embedded, as well as the linguistic habits they are used to, make the difference
since they shape the core of one’s being in the world, identified by Rorty in “conscience
and  aesthetic  taste,”  which,  as  he  explains  in  Trotsky  and  the  Wild  Orchids, can  be
considered  “equally,  products  of  the  cultural  environment  in  which  we  grew  up”
(Rorty 1999: 15). Cultural differences are so deep and strong that there is not, and there
can never be, any neutral “common ground” to which individuals, who have different
forms  of  conscience  and  esthetic  taste,  can  “repair”  in  order  to  argue  out  their
differences (Rorty 1999: 15); we need therefore to acknowledge the incommensurability
of different life stories and narratives, which are the by-product of different processes
of inculturation and socialization but, as Rorty points out in Universality and Truth we
should  also  be  aware  that  “there  are  not  incommensurable  languages”  since  “any
language can be learned by one who is able to use any other languages” (Rorty 2000: 18)
which means that people can always overcome the communicative barriers determined
by  the  use  of  different  linguistic  codes  by  making  new  hermeneutic  moves.  This
requires a move away from what in Contingency,  Irony,  and Solidarity he describes as
“common  sense”  language,  which  refers  to  the  “final  vocabulary”  individuals  “are
habituated” to use (Rorty 1989: 74). According to Rorty’s vision, when people refer to
common  sense  linguistic  structures  there  cannot  be  any  possibility  of  a  reflective
encounter of any kind based on rational argumentation, on the basis of the possibility
of  performing  what  Jürgen  Habermas  (1990  [1983])  would  define  as  a  form  of
“communicative  action.”  For this  reason,  Rorty  is  extremely  critical  of  Habermas’
reference to a rational frame of reference according to which individuals can dialogue
and  communicate,  beyond  cultural  constraints.  Accordingly,  as  the  American
philosopher points out in Philosophy and Social Hope, if there is no shared ethical and
esthetic  understanding  of  the  world,  conflicts  and  quarrels  of  any  type  cannot  be
overcome through argumentation and reasoning. Under these conditions, therefore,
there can be no way to negotiate with the bullies we encounter on the playground of
our life in order to understand their reasons, and to make them understand ours.
Within this framework, individuals who have different cultural, economic, political and
social backgrounds and insist on affirming their ideas on the basis of a universal idea of
truth, referring to established frames of reference, will always “strike one another as
begging all the crucial questions, arguing in circles” (Rorty 1999: 15), systematically
descending into fallacies,  attempting to prove any proposition while simultaneously
taking that proposition for granted. In Universality and Truth Rorty makes a distinction
between  “arguing  with  people”  and  “educating  people”  in  order  to  point  out  the
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ineffectiveness  of  rational  argumentation  within  a  specific  communicative  context
(Rorty  2000:  19). In  Rorty’s  view,  the  point  is  not  only  that  argumentation  is  not
effective but, as Susan Dieleman points out, “argumentation does not break out of the
established  conventions,  and  because  novelty  is  required  for  social  progress,  the
motivation  must  come  from  elsewhere”  (Dieleman  2010:  893). The  solution  is,
therefore,  to  elaborate  alternative  forms  of  communication  and  expression,  which
could have more effective practical outcomes, but this can happen only if people move
out from the conventional realm of the discourses they have been used to, and start to
re-frame and re-describe their world in new and different terms. Again in Universality
and Truth Rorty points out that what cannot be achieved on a rational basis through
argumentation could be achieved through an “appeal to sentiment” (Rorty 2000: 19).
On this basis he also grounds the possibility of using “non-violent means to change
minds”  (ibid.:  20)  by  stepping  into  a  different  discursive  context,  which  has  deep
pedagogical implications.
Nowadays, primary and secondary schools are at the crossroads of different cultural
instances  and  experiences  and  cannot  be  seen  as  the  safe  place  within  which
individuals can be engaged in reasonable conversations and discourses through which
different  cultural  traditions and different  vocabularies  can be harmonized within a
unitarian  democratic  educational  project.  This  is  particularly  significant  if  we
acknowledge,  as  Rosa  Calcaterra  points  out,  how  there  is  “an  evident  asymmetry
between the convincing discourses provided for supporting the principle of cultural
pluralism  and  the  concrete  dynamics  of  the  socio-ethical  reality  of  our  time”
(Calcaterra 2015: 5) which, I believe, is a very delicate point in reference to educational
contexts.  Within  our  globalized  societies  schools,  are,  indeed,  the  melting  pot  of
conflicting  instances  and  are  the  ground  on  which  individuals  with  different
experiences,  opportunities  and  stories  come  to  interact  and  grow  together,  being
continuously  faced  with  the  impossible  but  fascinating  task  of  sharing
incommensurable experiences through incommensurable narratives and vocabularies.
Moreover, the playgrounds of real schools are the foreground of the encounter, often
conflictual,  of  youngsters  whose  educational  possibilities  are  conditioned  by  their
cultural and social backgrounds and life histories, which are incomparable and unique
but still  need to be taken into account in order to be explored and contrasted with
other possible expressions and narratives. In this context bullies and their victims can
reframe their relationship only if they have the opportunity to develop a deeper and
wider vision of individual and collective experience,  which would allow them to be
engaged in other and different discourses, to re-describe the world in new terms and to
share their re-descriptions through multiple narratives. As Tracy Llanera explains, this
can  occur  only  on  the  basis  of  an  involvement  in  some  kind  of  “redemptive
relationship” and of an encounter with alternative lifeworlds (Llanera 2019: 27), which
is a crucial educational issue.
According  to  a  Rortyan  approach,  what  should  be  first  of  all  cultivated  within
educational  contexts  is  not  the  capacity  to  argue,  communicate  and  reflect  on  a
rational basis, but rather the capacity to listen, to describe and re-describe, and to use
different  and  even  new forms  of  language  and  new words  in  order  to  create  new
narratives  and  re-write  the  scripts  individuals  have  been  referring  to.  In  this
perspective, individuals come to have the possibility of developing peculiar capacities
of re-description that are mobilized essentially at a private level but, and this is my
point, require to be developed at a public level. As Rorty points out in Contingency, Irony,
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and Solidarity “the vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared, unsuited
to  argument”  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  “a  medium  for  argumentative  exchange”
(Rorty 1989: xiv) but, rather, it can be a tool for a new understanding of the world that
other individuals may be challenged to use. As a matter of fact, this is one of the most
controversial  points in Rorty’s scholarship due to his insistence on the necessity of
separating  the  private  from  the  public  dimensions  of  human  experience.  This
separation is, indeed, particularly problematic from a pedagogical point of view since it
would  mean  that  the  educational  experience  and  its  outcomes  are  essentially
contingent, private and personal and therefore they cannot be designed and planned in
advance,  nor can they be considered to be for  each and everyone.  Moreover,  since
education is a public endeavor, it makes use of shared experiences and resources and
makes use of public spaces within which the process of self-creation becomes visible
and tangible. 
As a matter of fact, in his Intellectual Autobiography Rorty pointed out that there is no
“barrier”  between the  public  and private  spheres  (Rorty  2010:  21)  but  that  private
projects are often not relevant to an individual’s public engagement, which occurs on a
different basis. Indeed, as Tracy Llanera notes, there is a common feature that connects
the  two  dimensions,  which  can  be  described  as  self-enlargement,  since  both  self-
creation and solidarity enlarge the individual and collective experience (Llanera 2016).
From a pedagogical  point  of  view this  feature could be the basis  of  an educational
project  which could  refer  to  private  experiences  of  self  enlargement  that  could  be
shared and developed within a  public  dimension.  Along a  similar  line  of  reasoning
Michael Bacon notes that if in Rorty “self-creation begins as a private matter, it need
not end there,” meaning that individuals, through the process of self-creation, which is
strictly connected with Rorty’s notion of “irony,” come to offer re-descriptions which
have  a  social  impact  since  they  “call  into  question  received  wisdom”  and  draw
attention to “unnoticed forms of cruelty” (Bacon 2017: 961, 962). As we can see, the
main focus  of  Rorty’s  idea of  “irony,”  which is  the tool  that  individuals  use  to  re-
describe their references and their world, is cruelty and in particular, those forms of
cruelty that are accepted as legitimate within a cultural, historical and social context,
like the cruelty of bullies who attack a child in the playground, or the cruelty of the
German soldiers who shared responsibility for the Holocaust.  Accordingly, the main
outcome  of  a  process  of  re-description  and  self  re-creation,  at  an  individual  and
collective  level,  is  therefore  the  capacity  to  detect  and  overcome  cruelty  within
different kinds of human experience, which can be identified as a relevant educational
goal.  Within this framework, one interesting point to discuss is,  therefore,  whether
individual capacities of re-description can possibly be used as a reference at a social
and  public  level  and  what  their  educational  impact  could  be,  taking  into  account
cultural  and  contextual  differences.  Let  us  think,  for  example,  of  the  educational
impact that the reading of Anna Frank’s diary, a very private and individual document
that was not meant to become public,  has had,  and still  has,  on the consciences of
thousands of adolescents since its first publication.
Rorty’s  separation  between  the  private  and  the  public  is  emblematic  of  what  in
Contingency,  Irony,  and  Solidarity  (1989)  he  acknowledges  as  the  “contingency”  of
individual  and social  experience.  In  order  to  clarify  this  point  we can refer  to  the
reading of the Rortyan thesis of contingency offered by René V. Arcilla (1993),  who
highlights how it is mainly based on “the freedom of re-description” which enables us
to “celebrate what distinguishes one’s self from others through the exercise of irony”
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(Arcilla 1993: 202). As Daniel Conway (1991) points out, in Rorty ironic self creation is
“exclusively  a  private  affair”  which therefore  has  no  or  little  impact  on the  social
contexts which people live in nor on society as a whole; through irony individuals can
re-describe their life and re-create themselves, but this is a contingent and situated
process that cannot be shared with other individuals. Thus, the ironist Rorty can look
back at his adolescence and re-describe the scenes he has been involved in. However,
the same scenes and the same scripts will be repeated over time if there is never a
public and shared re-description of the roles of, and relationships between, classmates,
which  could  be  useful  also  to  reframe  the  relationships  between  individuals  and
society. In these terms, confining irony to the private sphere means “restricting its
corrosive  power to  the personal  pursuit  of  autonomy” (Conway 1991:  198)  and not
letting it act in depth on the narratives and scripts that frame the social experience of
individuals  and  communities.  Scott  Holland  (2004),  who  explores  Rorty’s  use  of
literature to find alternative tools to re-describe human experience, points out how his
“fondness  for  the  thrill  of  self-creation”  (Holland  2004:  494)  is  the  key  to  an
understanding  of  the  Rortyan  vision  of  the  relationship  between  individuals and
society,  which  is  also  particularly  significant  from  a  pedagogical  point  of  view.  In
particular, it is important to point out that at the root of the process of self-creation
Rorty introduces a key element that requires an in-depth exploration. We can detect it
in the passage of Trotsky and the Wild Orchids where Rorty points out that we are “just
luckier, not more insightful, than the bullies with whom we struggle” (Rorty 1999: 15)
since “we” – the individuals who have a shared understanding of the world as “liberal
ironists” –, unlike the bullies, have had an opportunity to re-determine ourselves.
What Rorty calls “luck” is defined as an undetermined space within which education
can make a difference, but always on an individual and private basis. Nicholas Rescher
(2001 [1995]) describes “luck” as a “rogue force that prevents human life from being
fully domesticated to rational management. Its foothold on the world stage is secure by
the power of chance, chaos, and choice. Luck and her cousins, fate and fortune, make it
somewhere between difficult and impossible to manage our lives successfully simply
through planning and design” (Rescher 2001: 12) due to the fact that “our condition on
the world’s stage is the product of fate (what we are), of fortune (the conditions and
circumstances  in  which  we  are  placed),  and  of  luck  (what  chances  happen to  us)”
(Rescher 2001: 39). This understanding of the notion of luck is consistent with Rosa
Calcaterra’s (2019) analysis of Rortyan “contingentism” understood as “a conceptual
net  tied  to  the  criteria  of  indeterminacy,  ambiguity,  uncertainty  and  randomness”
(Calcaterra 2019: ix).  “Luck” is,  indeed, an “untranslatable” term. Gérald Sfez (2014)
explains  that  it  has  been  used  over  time  to  design  “either  chance,  devoid  of  all
intention, or the necessity of nature, that is to say the essential that with which human
‘freedom of action’ is concerned”; on these bases he moves on to name “the paradox of
the  relation  between  chance,  necessity,  and  freedom  in  a  manner  that  remains
mythical without being a mystification” (Sfez 2014: 535). In literature, which is Rorty’s
most congenial cultural tool, “mythical” refers essentially to what Thomas Stearns Eliot
in Ulysses, Order, and Myth (1923) describes as a “method,” first acknowledged by Yeats,
useful for the creation of a narrative order by using a peculiar “way of controlling, of
ordering, of giving shape and significance to the immense panorama of futility and
anarchy which is contemporary history” (Eliot 1923: 483), thereby making reference to
the images and myths of the past.
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Similarly, Rorty uses the term “luck,” which has a deep and dense cultural history, in
accordance with a literary (non-philosophical) method, which helps him to give shape
and meaning to  the  contingency of  human experience, creating a  narrative  thread
which can help individuals connect the past and present and make meaning of the
present through the images of the past. This methodological choice deeply informs also
Rorty’s  understanding  of  the  role  and  function  of  education  and  his  view  of  the
educational process. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Rorty highlights how individual
experience  can  be  understood  in  accordance  with  two  different  perspectives:  a)  a
perspective  deriving  from  western  philosopical  tradition  which  celebrates  the
individual capacity to “break out” of the world of time, appearance and idiosyncrasy
and to  reach a  stable  frame of  reference identifiable  in  terms of  “truth”;  and b)  a
Nietzschian  perspective  which  celebrates  the  capacity  to  escape  from  inherited
descriptions of the contingencies of existence and to find new descriptive patterns.
These  two  perspectives  highlight  how individuals  are  moved  either  by  what  Rorty
defines  as  “a  will  to  truth”  or  by  a  “will  to  self-overcoming”  (Rorty  1989:  29).
Accordingly, “the drama of an individual human life is not one in which a pre-existent
goal  is  triumphantly reached or tragically not reached” following either a constant
external  reference  or  an  “unfailing  interior  source  of  inspiration.”  Rather,  it  is  “a
process of Nietzschean self-overcoming” portrayed as a “dramatic narrative” whose
paradigm is “the life of the genius” who “has found a way to describe that past which
the past never knew, and thereby found a self to be which her precursors never knew
was possible” (Rorty 1989: 29).
The  genius,  in  Rorty’s  view,  is  not  a  particularly  gifted  individual  who  has  innate
qualities but someone who is sustained by a strong “will of self becoming,” which is not
a  will  to  escape  from,  contrast  or make  fun  of  the  cultural  habits  and  traditions
individuals  are embedded in,  but  to re-use and re-invent them in a  new and more
meaningful way. This means that all individuals have the opportunity to be educated,
but also that this depends on the contingent and “lucky” encounter of an individual
with someone who, or something which, can sustain their process of growth. Within
this  framework  Rorty  refers  to  a  specific  sort  of  luck,  the  luck  “which  makes  the
difference between genius and eccentricity,” describing it as a function of contingency,
which  is  tightly  interwoven with  the  individual  capacity  to  move  forward  and the
opportunities of “self overcoming” that individuals can grasp and use in the unfolding
of their life experience.
This notion of “luck” is a key and recurring element in Rorty’s educational discourse
and contributes also to define the organization of the educational process, as we can
see in Universality and Truth. Here, Rorty describes education, with a specific focus on
college education, as a contextualist effort to help individuals become “participants” in
a shared conversation through a systematic engagement with experiences leading to a
process of “self-overcoming” which is facilitated by a specific form of “luck”: the luck
to  have  been  involved  in  an educational  experience,  and  sometimes  to  have  been
engaged  in  an  educational  relationship,  that  fosters  the  development  of  an  ironic
attitude. Therefore, he affirms that “students are lucky” to find themselves “under the
benevolent Herrschaft [domination]” (Rorty 2000: 22) of a professor or a mentor who
offers them the opportunity to “overcome themselves” in order to gain the ability to
“re-describe” their experiences in different terms. But what is the role and function of
Rorty’s  understanding  of  “luck”  if  we  focus  on the  relationship  between formative
processes and educational experiences? Can we use the pattern inscribed within Rorty’s
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notion of “luck” in order to understand the educational process in its mythical tension
between the  past  and present, the  cultural  heritage  and tradition,  focusing  on the
possibility that  individuals  have to invent and re-describe their  own traditions and
vocabularies?
The cultural environment which individuals come from is always the first element that
requires  to  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to  understand  the  contingency  of  any
educational  experience  within  individual  formative  processes  and  to evaluate  its
impact  in  a  long  term  perspective.  As  Jim  Garrison  points  out,  in  Rorty’s  view
“Education is the site of cultural reproduction” (Garrison 2001: 48) and this happens
through a hermeneutic process emerging from the encounter with the narratives that
represent  the  cultural  and  social  traditions  which  individuals  are  exposed  to.
Nonetheless, we see that, in Rorty’sview, in order to be effectively educational,  this
process  should be motivated not  by a  “will  to  truth” but  rather by a  “will  to  self-
overcoming” – recalling the categories introduced by Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity. Accordingly, education should therefore lead individuals and communities to
be engaged as active participants in a cultural process which is not merely a process of
the acquisition and reproduction of cultural references and values, but rather a process
of  the  acquisition  of  cultural  tools  that  the  individuals  can  use  to  become  active
participants in a process of growth and change.
This vision of education is clearly an overcoming of the Platonic tradition that has been
the  main  cultural  reference  for  Western  pedagogy  and  has  deeply  influenced  the
development of educational actions and practices. In Hermeneutics, General Studies, and
Teaching (1982)  Rorty  tries  to  sketch  a  conception  of  education  starting  from
Nietzschean rather than Platonic assumptions and describes the educational process as
“participation in a  community effort,  learning to  take a  hand in what  is  going on,
learning to speak more of the language which his time and place in history has destined
him to speak” (Rorty 1982: 8). Therefore, each individual through education is engaged
in the different cultural narratives which are providing her or him with references that
should not be proposed as absolute truths, but rather as true statements acknowledged
in a certain milieu and in a definite cultural and social context. This makes possible the
emergence and contrasting of different statements and claims of truth, according to a
vision consistent with Rorty’s understanding of philosophy and of its relationship to
politics and society.
In  The  Priority  of  Democracy  to  Philosophy (1992  [1984]),  Rorty  acknowledges  the
“priority” of democracy to philosophy asserting that the worry for freedom is more
relevant than the worry for truth; accordingly,  democracy should be understood as
both the moral condition and the moral end of any educational project, since it is the
grounding  condition  of  the possibility  of  expressing  oneself  through  different
vocabularies  and  of  being  exposed  to  those  vocabularies.  As  Rorty  explains  in
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity “truth is a property of sentences, since sentences are
dependent for their existence upon vocabularies, and since vocabularies are made by
human  beings,  so  are  truths”  (Rorty  1989:  21).  In  this  perspective  the  educational
experience  is  what  allows  us  to  understand  the  infinite  creative  and  re-creative
potentialities  of  the  human mind  and  its  relationship  with  the  social  and  political
contexts within which it emerges.
For this reason, as Abellanosa points out, in a Rortyian perspective, even in the phase of
socialization education is not “a process of helping us to get in touch with something
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non-human called  Truth or  Reality  (other-worldly,  objective,  ultimate,  unchanging)
rather  it  is  what  keeps  us  in  touch  with  our  potentialities”  and  transforms  itself,
through the phase of individuation, into what Abellanosa has described as “the process
of  inventing  something  which  will  improve  (Dewey  pragmatic)  our  “tradition”
(Gadamer  hermeneutics),  i.e. “what  we  have  been  told”  (Abellanosa  2010:  98).
Nonetheless,  the possibility of inventing and re-describing one’s own traditions and
vocabularies  is  closely  connected  to  the  political  conditions  which  allow  or  limit
individuals in their capacity to imagine new conditions and new possibilities, which is
not only a matter of  ethical  but also of  esthetic  judgment.  “Truth” and “freedom,”
which  are  the  Rortyan  equivalents  of  heteronomy  and  autonomy,  are  the  two
constitutive elements of the educational process and should therefore be seen as part
of an experiential continuum,  to speak in Deweyan terms, and not as expressions of
opposite narratives, as Rorty points out in Philosophy and Social Hope.
Here he tries to overcome the cultural and political dichotomy between the “right” and
“left”  visions  of  education,  the  former  based  on  a  Platonic  and  the  latter  on  a
Rousseauian and Marxist view, focusing on the idea that education is “the shaping of an
animal into a human being by a process of socialization, followed (with luck) by the
self-individualization and self-creation of that human being through his or her own
later revolt against that very process” (Rorty 1999: 118). As Maria Virginia Machado
Dazzani points out, in Rorty’s view the two main aims of the educational enterprise are
both to maintain one’s own experiences and to determine one’s own future (Machado
Dazzani 2013) and they should be pursued in this order.  However,  as Rorty himself
explains, in this process “socialization has to come before individuation, and education
for freedom cannot begin before some constraints have been imposed” (Rorty 1999:
118),  which  occurs  during  the  primary  and  secondary  education  period  aimed  at
familiarizing the young with what their elders take to be true, whether it is true or not.
These  constraints  are  cultural  constraints,  and  are  therefore  contingent  and
historically determined by the different times and places which people are living in.
This means that education cannot be conceived as existing outside a community, which
is the context that holds and shares acknowledged descriptions of the world, keeps
memories  of  previous  descriptions  and  narratives,  and  constructs  and negotiates
“truths,”  including  and legitimating  new  participants  in  the process  of  knowledge
construction and transmission. The community is therefore the “public” space within
which individual conscience and esthetic taste are formed through the socialization
process within which students “take over the moral and political common sense of the
society as it is” (Rorty 1999: 116).
Nonetheless,  as  Holland  notes,  Rorty  is  not  a  communitarian  but  he  is  rather
“impatient with the excessive trend in the contemporary academy and society that
celebrates group identity and identity politics” and considers questions such as “What
culture do we come from? and What is our relation to that culture?” philosophically
and educationally irrelevant. Since he is more interested in the politics of individuality,
he  acknowledges  as  more  “edificant”  the  celebration of  “Emersonian type stories,”
which  “provide  accounts  of  how  people  walked  away  from  identification  with  this
group or that community” and “use individual models to carve out a personal identity
rather than turn to group mores to ask how the individual might find his plot and place
in  some  collective  identity”  (Holland  2004:  500).  Therefore,  it  makes  a  substantial
difference whether or not an individual grows up in a democratic environment, since
this determines how the process of “socialization” occurs, which discourses and values
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the individuals are exposed to, and which kind of vocabularies they learn to use in
order to express their ideas and feelings. 
Indeed, Rorty’s vision of democracy is culturally grounded in the pragmatist, liberal
and cultural milieu in which he grew up, as he explains in Philosophy and Social Hope. 
The United States  allows US citizens to  open “a prospect  on illimitable  democratic
vistas” since the country is, according to Rorty “despite its past and present atrocities
and vices, and despite its continuing eagerness to elect fools and knaves to high office”
a  “good  example  of  the  best  kind  of  society  so  far  invented”  (Rorty  1999:  4).
Accordingly, individuals who grow up there can have the opportunity to be exposed to
discourses  and  narratives  which  shape  their  conscience  according  to  a  democratic
ethos and their esthetic taste according to a narrative and shared understanding of
individual and collective experience. 
Nonetheless,  this  is  a  matter  of  a  mixture  of  contingent  elements  that  Rorty
acknowledges as “luck.” Contingency is therefore an original condition that leaves us
open for different individual opportunities and spaces of socialization and, hopefully,
of individuation. If it is true that it is the contingent condition of a human being that
determines if one grows up in a moral community that shapes one’s conscience and
esthetic  taste,  it  is  also  true  that,  according  to  Rorty,  there  are  differences  in  the
educational value of the socialiazation projects that the different moral communities
undertake.  Therefore,  the acknowledgment of  existing cultural  differences does not
justify  the  acknowledgment  of  a  “cultural  relativism”  which  would  legitimate  the
educational validity of any kind of experience, discourse and narrative, even the most
distorted  and  anti-democratic.  Rorty’s  educational  proposal  is  indeed  an
“ethnocentric” one, since he points out that what he acknowledges as “Our moral view”
(democratic, liberal) is:
I firmly believe, much better than any competing view, even though there are a lot
of people whom you will never be able to convert to it. It is one thing to say, falsely,
that there is nothing to choose between us and the Nazis. It is another thing to say,
correctly, that there is no neutral, common ground to which an experienced Nazi
philosopher and I can repair in order to argue out our differences. That Nazi and I
will  always  strike  one  another  as  begging  all  the  crucial  questions,  arguing  in
circles. (Rorty 1999: 15)
The lack of this common ground depends not only on the lack of a shared cultural
background, of shared narratives and “heroes,” which as a consequence produces the
impossibility of creating a common communicative space and of making equivalent use
of the same vocabulary or even of constructing a new vocabulary but, before that, on
the lack of a democratic moral foundation of individual and collective living as well on
the lack of shared esthetic experiences.
It is at this point useful to note that Rorty’s ethnocentrism cannot be assimilated to
what is commonly understood as an uncritical faith in the superiority of one’s home
culture’s  beliefs,  practices  and  institutions  but,  as  Rorty  points  out  in  Objectivity,
Relativism, and Truth (1991), it is a product of “the liberal culture of recent times” which
is “open to encounters with other actual and possible cultures,” and is willing to “make
this openness central to its self-image.” In so doing, it enhances its “ability to increase
the  freedom  and  openness  of  encounters,  rather  than  […]  its  possession  of  truth”
(Rorty  1991:  2).  In  this  perspective  liberal  culture,  “constantly  adding  on  more
windows, constantly enlarging its sympathies,” proposes itself as “a form of life which
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is constantly extending pseudopods and adapting itself to what it encounters. Its sense
of its own moral worth is founded on its tolerance of diversity” (Rorty 1991: 204).
As  a  product  of  the  process  of  socialization,  according to  this  liberal  ethnographic
educational  narrative,  individuals  are,  as  David  Hildelbrand says,  “acculturated  but
open”  (Hildebrand  2003).  In  this  perspective,  Maximiliano  Figueroa  Muñoz  sees
ethnocentrism as “a condition to recognize and take into intercultural  dialogue,  an
invitation to respect cultural difference and the task of managing it in order to turn it
into a critical self-ethnocentrism and make it transferable to cultural influences that
can generate relations of more solidarity” (Figueroa Muñoz 2016: 73). This perspective
is  also consistent  with David Hansen’s  idea of  an educational  cosmopolitanism that
includes a grounding “loyalty to the known” and a perspectival “openness to new” (cf.
Hansen 2003). However, it has some specific connotations connected to a vision of the
educational process, which may have different outcomes according to the success of its
phases, within the framework of a very clear view of the human self as well as of the
individual engagement in social life.
According to Rorty, the phase of socialization is followed by a phase of individuation,
which can be seen as the second distinct and important element of the process that in
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature he had described as “edification,” intended as “the
project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking” (Rorty
1979: 360); edification is indeed the final step of a lifelong project of the self-formation
and  re-creation  of  human  beings  intended  as  a  contingent,  centerless  network  of
beliefs,  desires  and narratives.  René Arcilla  (1990),  Carol  Nicholson (1989)  and Gert
Biesta (1996) have discussed this idea of education as edification which occurs through
conversation,  as  well  as  through  a  deeper  and  wider  participation  in  multiple
discourses and narratives.Within the current educational debate this idea is, indeed,
very promising and useful in terms of overcoming current mainstream narratives but
in my opinion there are some points that need to be discussed and clarified.
First of all,  according to Rorty the phase of individuation, which not all  individuals
have the “luck” to be engaged in, is experienced during the college years which are
aimed at offering “a provocation to self-creation” and therefore at helping students
“realize they can reshape themselves” (Rorty 1999: 118),  developing an increasingly
critical, reflective and “ironic” attitude towards the world. Indeed, as Michael Bacon
points  out,  this  attitude is  the ground on which to  build  an ironic  process  of  self-
creation which plays also a social role “precisely by expanding logical space” (Bacon
2017: 961); moreover, as Christopher Voparil notes, irony “opens a space of freedom,
choice, and responsibility that demands our own willed or self-chosen commitment”
(Voparil 2016: 1) engaging individuals in a continuous conversation with the others and
offering them “alternative perspectives from which to see things” which are precisely
“what break the hold of our current, often unquestioned, lenses in order to bring the
previously occluded into view” (Voparil 2016: 15).
In this process they learn to look at the world from a different perspective, and become
capable of re-describing it  in new and different terms; therefore, the process of re-
shaping individual  life  goes hand in hand with a process of  “re-description” of  the
world and of the narratives which individuals are embedded in. As Paulo Ghilardelli Jr.
(1999)  points  out,  in  this  phase  education can be  seen as  a  process  which sustains
individuals  in  the  elaboration  of  new ways  of  experimenting  the  world  and  of  re-
creating it through the use of new languages, new vocabularies, new images and new
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metaphors within a complex dynamics of  continuity,  change and growth.  But what
happens to those individuals who do not have the opportunity to attend college? When
and where does the process of individuation really start? Can it occur outside formal
contexts or through other forms of relationship and engagement?
Undoubtedly,  Rorty’s  educational  proposal  has  the  merit  of  defining  a  general
framework  within  which  it  is  possible  to  articulate  or  re-articulate  the  different
dimensions of the educational process; nonetheless, compared to the complexity and
reality of contemporary educational contexts within a globalized world, the process
described requires to be enlarged and integrated, taking into account also the previous
additional  experiences  that  individuals  gather  within  informal  contexts  and  the
complex interaction occurring between formal and informal contexts. Moreover, the
educational process Rorty refers to represents what occurs, or should occur, within a
particular kind of democratic society, according to an ethnocentric perspective. It is
organized  in  such  a  way  that  the  process  of  socialization,  intended  mainly  as
acculturation, is conceived as a phase, long lasting but preliminary, in the process of
individual  edification.  This  process  occurs  only  if  certain  conditions  hold:  a)  the
individual has been exposed to cultural elements that can be potentially re-described
since  they  are  not  proposed  as  truths  but  as  sentences;  b)  individual  freedom  is
preserved  and  cultivated;  and  c)  the  individual  has  the  “luck”  to  be  engaged  in  a
process of edification. But what happens if none of these conditions are satisfied? Or if
even one of them is not previously fulfilled? Certain individuals, from birth, in various
different  cultural  and  political  contexts  are  embedded  in  informal  or  formal
experiences  of  socialization  which  are  not  intended  as  a  preliminary  step  to  a
subsequent process of individuation, but are conceived as totalizing, truth oriented and
therefore lacking any premise for an authentic process of edification. Let us think, for
example, of the child soldiers of the Camorra (the Neapolitan mafia), who are raised
according  to  shared  scripts  and  narratives  within  which  negative  “heroes”  are
identified as role models, and who grow up within discourses and vocabularies strongly
connotated, which do not offer any space for re-interpretation or re-description. Let us
think  of  the  children  born  and  raised  within  the  Daesh Caliphate,  who  have  been
indoctrinated  and  exposed  to  discourses  and  narratives  aimed  at  shaping  and
controlling, rather than edifying, their conscience. What chance do these children have
of being engaged in a process of individuation and edification and where and when
could this occur?
According to the framework designed by Rorty it seems to be almost impossible, unless
they  are,  on  an  individual  basis,  “lucky”  enough  to  escape  from  the  cultural  and
historical context they live in and the narratives which they have been exposed to. In
order to have the opportunity to develop a new vocabulary, they need, indeed, to be
exposed to  other  languages  and narratives  and to  encounter  opportunities  of  “self
overcoming” outside and beyond the socialization processes which they are engaged in.
Tracy Llanera explains  how Rorty’s  work can help “make sense of  the interlocking
features of truth, language, and solidarity that shape the life world” of this kind of
individual  and highlights  the role  of  “redemptive  relationships”  which “attempt to
capture the non-cognitive dimension of human encounter” (Llanera 2019: 20), thereby
pointing  out  the  essential  role  played  by  some  kinds of  relationship  that  have  an
educational  role  since  they  offer  individuals  the  possibility  to  look  at  their  own
experience from a different perspective. We should bear in mind that the formative
process  unfolds  at  different  levels  and  in  different  domains  of  human  experience,
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involving multiple actors, times and spaces. Accordingly, from a pedagogical point of
view, we should not look at the process of edification as circumscribed and separated
within a defined time and space; it is, instead, necessary to explore the conditions that
may allow all  individuals,  even those who do not  seem to have the opportunity to
escape from the narratives which they are involved in, to engage in a process of self-
disclosure, self-discovery, self-understanding and self-determination, in any dimension
and at any moment of the formative process. This requires a focus on the potentially
edifying  opportunities  that  may  function  as  potential  hidden triggers  of  a  “will  of
overcoming,” as well as on the multiple and various relationships that constitute the
texture of individual experience in order to detect the educational potential embedded
within it, and to envisage the possible trajectories of edification that each individual
could  be  engaged in.  We should  also  consider  that  the  outcomes of  the  process  of
socialization are crucial in the definition of the possibility of individual edification and,
therefore, we cannot separate them from the process of individuation.
On this basis, I agree with Robert Reich who does not see the reason why the process of
socialization must be separate and distinct from the process of individuation. “Why
could they not, for example, proceed simultaneously and co-exist within a continuous
project, just as liberalism and irony co-exist within Rorty’s utopian community? Rorty
unfairly and arbitrarily limits the process of individuation to colleges and universities.
In  doing  so,  he  undermines  the  effect  and  drastically  limits  the  scope  of  the
“‘provocation to self-creation’ so crucial to his liberal utopia” (Reich 1996: 346). This is
also  the  opinion of  Khosrow Bagheri  Noaparast  (2014)  who points  out  that  Rorty’s
“dichotomy” between socialization and edification “makes  edification impossible  to
achieve unless there can be a relation between the two phases of education” (Bagheri
Noaparast  2014:  98).  If  the  process  of  individuation  unfolds  as  a  process  of  re-
description  and  discovery  of  new possibilities  of  individual  and  collective  life,  this
opportunity should be offered to each and every individual from the very beginning of
the educational project and within different educational contexts, formal, non-formal
and informal, also taking into account the fact that not every project unfolds according
to a linear perspective that leads to formal higher education. 
Rorty  acknowledges  the  educational  value  of  multiple  and  different  educational
experiences  and  of  the  exposure  to  multiple  cultural  stimuli,  and  encourages
individuals  to  move  around  the  cultural  bazaar  offered  by  our  contingent  world.
However,  he does not clearly point out how it  might be possible to integrate these
experiences into a continuous and comprehensive educational  project within which
each and every one could have equal opportunities to grow. This requires a re-framing
of the individual process of edification, which – in order be effective and generative –
should not be understood only as a private experience, but also as a public reference
for other individuals.
This  is  consistent  with  Rorty’s  idea  of  social  development  as  a  process  guided  by
“instructive” stories to share, as he points out in Justice as a Larger Loyalty, rather than
rational norms, principles and values mastered by a “universal human capacity” (Rorty
1997:  147).  An  educational  project  inscribed  within  this  vision  of  social  growth  is
described  in  Human  Rights,  Rationality  and  Sentimentality, where  the  American
philosopher highlights the necessity of taking into account the fact that some people
“were  not  so  lucky in  the  circumstances  of  their  upringing”  since  they  have  been
“deprived”  of  “security  and  sympathy”  which  are  essential  conditions  to  foster
individual and collective projects of edification. Again, Rorty uses the term “luck” to
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describe  a  specific  and  crucial  educational  condition,  which  I  believe  represents  a
challenge for a democratic society, within which everybody has the right to be “lucky.”
This  means that  in  a  democratic  society there should not  be deprived and “lucky”
individuals or,  at  least,  there should always be the opportunity for all  to overcome
deprived  life  conditions.  The  only  way  to  engage  both  “deprived”  and  “lucky”
individuals in a unified educational project is to inscribe them within a broader process
of  social  development,  aimed  at  acknowledging  and  reducing  the  conditions  of
deprivation, and cultural and social change according to shared instances and hopes,
overcoming  the  distinction  between  the  private  and  public  dimensions  of  human
experience. This requires the reference to a peculiar educational narrative that can
effectively  make  use  of  what  Rorty  calls  “sentimental  education,”  whose  aim is  to
develop in each individual an increasing capacity to see similarities beyond differences,
which can be fostered through a  deep engagement in a  variety of  life  stories,  that
contribute to the creation of new shared narratives and vocabularies (Rorty 1998: 128).
If  the  role  of  education  is  to  determine  luckier  upbringing  conditions  for  a wider
number  of  individuals  and  communities,  this  may  occur  only  on  the  basis  of  the
creation of a shared space of understanding within which the public encounter with
private  stories  of  edification  can  sustain  a  reflective  acknowledgment  of  the
contingency of the human experience, and a shared commitment to enhance the “will
of overcoming” both for individuals and for the communities they live in, which is the
basis of any democratic society.
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ABSTRACTS
Starting from an emblematic episode described by Rorty in Trotsky and the Wild Orchids, which is
an effective narrative example of making public a private experience, the article provides an
inquiry  into  Rorty’s  thinking  around  education,  with  a  particular  focus  on  his  notions  of
contingency and luck.In particular, the article offers an analysis of Rorty’s frequent use of the
term  “luck,”  in  accordance  with  a  literary  (non-philosophical)  method,  which  informs  his 
Notes from the Playground
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
15
understanding of the role and function of education and his view of the educational process. The
use  of  a  literary  method is  useful to  give  shape and meaning to  the  contingency of  human
experience, creating a narrative thread to connect the past and present and make meaning of the
present through the images of the past. Within this framework, Rorty understands “luck” as a
specific  and crucial  condition that  highlights  the presence of  an undetermined space within
which education can make a difference in individual life.
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